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Health Transfers: An Application of
Health-Health Analysis to Assess
Food Safety Regulations*
Fred Kuchler, Jackqueline L. Teague, Richard A. Williams &
Don W. Anderson**
Introduction
Policies designed to lower particular public health risks may
unintentionally raise other health risks. Health policy analysts have long
recognized this premise. We examine one of the mechanisms through
which health risks may rise. A potential Gulf oyster harvesting ban to
control fatalities from exposure to Vibrio vulnificus illustrates the
quantitative comparison of reductions in target risks to adverse health
outcomes. We estimate both the number of unintended adverse health
outcomes and the distribution of those outcomes throughout the
population. We also identify subpopulations by gender and ethnicity
and provide a count of induced deaths for each. The illustration shows
it is possible to measure both net health benefits and the extent to
which public sector health and safety programs transfer risks, and hence
health, from one group to another.
Lester Lave argues that analysts could gauge the net health benefits
of public intervention using Risk-Risk Analysis, revealing that substitute
risks often replace risks public health policies reduce. 1 For example,
* Teague & Anderson acknowledge support of the Economics Branch of the
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). The authors also gratefully acknowledge the comments on
earlier drafts provided by Dr. Randall W. Lutter of the Office of Management and
Budget, Dr. Jean Buzby and Dr. Elise Golan of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), Dr. Josephine A. Mauskopf and Dr. Gary A. Zarkin of Research Triangle
Institute (RTI), and three anonymous reviewers. This paper was prepared by the
authors alone, and any views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect
those of the FDA, the USDA, or RTI.
** Dr. Kuchler is an economist with the USDA. He holds an A.B. (Economics) from
the University of California, Davis and an M.A. and Ph.D. (Economics) from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. E-mail: Jkuchler@econ.ag.gov.
Ms. Teague is an economist with RTI. She holds a B.A. (English) from Wake
Forest University and an M.A. (Economics) from North Carolina State University,
Greensboro.
10 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 315 [Fall 1999]
treating drinking water with chlorine reduces the incidence of some
diseases, but exposure to chlorine raises the risk of cancer.
There is another mechanism through which adverse unintended
health outcomes result from public sector efforts to manage health and
safety risks. Public sector actions may exert a negative influence on
health due to limited resources. As the public sector expands its
attempt to manage risks, it may reduce the ability of the private sector
to do so because new health and safety programs, like any new public
sector programs, will be accompanied by new costs. New regulatory
compliance costs or taxes required to finance such programs reduce
disposable income of those who incur the costs or bear the taxes. A
consequence of reduced income is less ability to privately purchase
goods and services, including those that reduce risks and promote
health. As individuals take additional risks, additional adverse health
outcomes may result.
Randall Lutter and John Morrall describe the small set of regulatory
and judicial decisions regarding workplace safety that this logic
influences. 2 They argue that analysts can compare a count of fatalities
averted by public sector programs with the fatalities induced by
regulatory costs. They title the comparison "Health-Health Analysis."
When analysts make the comparisons Lutter and Morrall suggest, they
are constructing information that a judge can use to determine whether
a program is a desirable or undesirable use of public resources. Lutter
and Morrall argue that, at a minimum, a program ought to yield more
lives saved than lives lost.
Economists take for granted that income influences individual risk
choices and thereby influences health. In tallying regulatory costs and
benefits, analysts usually know who will bear the costs, and analysts can
estimate the cost bearers' income. However, to estimate the number of
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Dominion University and a Ph.D. (Economics) from Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.
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I See Lester Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for
Policy (1981).
2 See Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way
to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 43 (1994).
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fatalities a proposed regulation might enduce, analysts need to know
how income loss is likely to affect the health of those who will bear
regulatory costs. The initial Health-Health Analysis (HHA)
applications, as well as the more recent applications to air quality
standards, 3 relied on estimates of mortality rates associated with
average income levels. These applications are admittedly imprecise;
regulatory costs may fall on people whose income is not average. In this
article, we illustrate the application of HHA using new estimates of the
linkage between income and health for specific subpopulations.
We estimate the number of lives lost by identifying which
subpopulations are likely to experience a fall in income and how the
health of those groups is likely to react. Ralph Keeney estimates the
relationship between income and mortality by demographic
category. 4 We use his results to transform increased regulatory costs
into increases in premature deaths for different subpopulations. The
sum of the subpopulation counts is our estimate of regulation-induced
deaths. Unlike previous analyses, our estimate shows that analysts can
account for the current distribution of income, the magnitude of
income losses, and demographic variables, factors that vary the health
loss resulting from income loss.
There is a second benefit to constructing lives lost by subpopulation.
Listing the losses shows whose health might be compromised by a
government program. That is, the lists show clearly how health is
transferred from one subpopulation to another.
Using results from Anderson et al., 5 we estimate mortality effects
of a potential oyster harvesting ban to protect consumers from the
pathogen Vibrio vulnificus. Their study estimates the income losses
derived from several approaches to control fatalities resulting from the
consumption of oysters contaminated by Vibrio vulnificus. The
bacteria Vibrio vulnificus occurs naturally in estuarine waters and is a
normal flora in molluscan shellfish, mainly oysters and clams. Since
3 See Wendy L. Gramm & Susan E. Dudley, The Human Costs of EPA
Standards, Wall St. J., June 9, 1997, at A18.
4 See Ralph L. Keeney, Estimating Fatalities Induced by the Economic Costs of
Regulations, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1997).
5 See Donald W. Anderson et al., Costs of Restrictions on Gulf Oyster
Harvesting for Control of Vibrio vulnificus-Caused Disease (RTI 1996).
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1979, Vibrio vulnificus has been known to cause food-related illnesses
resulting in acute gastroenteritis. Fulminating septicemia and death
occurs among those who have preexisting liver disease. 6 Essentially all
deaths are attributed to half-shell consumption of "live" oysters
harvested from the Gulf of Mexico and tributary waters between
April 1 and October 31 each year. Our calculations show net impacts
on averted premature deaths if authorities banned Gulf oyster
harvesting from April 1 through October 31.
If public health concerns prompts authorities to prohibit the harvest
of Gulf oysters from April 1 through October 31 each year, the Gulf
region would suffer substantial reductions in economic activity. Not
only would harvesters' incomes diminish, but incomes of individuals
employed at processing facilities, transportation companies, and
elsewhere in the region's economy would also diminish. Although a
traditional public health approach might motivate a harvesting
prohibition to eliminate premature deaths attributed to oyster-related
illnesses, this approach alone does not consider the fatalities that such a
control measure might cause through income losses. Here, we compare
the targeted reduction in fatalities attributed to half-shell consumption
to the induced fatalities resulting from income losses.
Regulation-Induced Fatalities
Using HHA, analysts recognize that individuals are substantially
responsible for managing their risks. Individuals make risk decisions
when they choose where to live and work, what kind of transportation
to use or buy, and what foods to eat. In effect, each choice a person
makes requires choosing their own acceptable level of risk. In each
decision, the risk level choice depends, to some degree, on income.
When incomes rise, risk decisions change and individuals generally
purchase greater assurance of health and safety; when incomes fall,
individuals cannot afford greater quantities of risk reduction. Because
regulatory policies influence disposable income, policies influence the
extent to which individuals can manage the risks they face.
6 See Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC), Draft Interstate Shellfish
Sanitation Conference Summary of Actions: Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Columbia,
SC, August 1995.
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In the private sector, regulatory costs affect businesses in the same
way as production costs. In the long run, increases require increased
prices. Market adjustments include reduced employment. Rising prices
and falling incomes mean individuals less able to avoid risks.
In national or global markets, even small price increases may have
measurable risk consequences. Taking only a few dollars of purchasing
power does not significantly affect a person's survival risk. Yet, if
everyone accepts, e.g., an additional fatality risk of one in a million,
across 260 million people we could anticipate 260 induced deaths.7
Premature deaths from income losses follow. Education and
income strongly indicate health status for both existing health stock
and health production through consumption. 8 Following income or
job loss, psychological distress is one pathway for reduction in
health. 9 The health effects from unemployment or joblessness may
include reduced activity and stimulation, and feelings of reduced self-
worth. In addition, unemployed workers often lose their health
insurance. 10 Many displaced workers remain uninsured, even after re-
employment.1 1 Without health insurance, individuals may delay
medical treatment.
7 See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a
Stronger Relationship Between Income and Mortality than the Rich? Implications of
Panel Data for Health-Health Analysis, 12 J. Risk & Uncertainty 51 (1996).
8 See James R. Blaylock & W. Noel Blisard, Food Security and Health Status in
the United States, 27 App. Econ. 961 (1995) and Jonathan S. Feinstein, The
Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Health: A Review of Literature, 71
Milbank Q. 279 (1993).
9 See, e.g., W. Fred & Gerrit Antonides, Costs and Benefits of Unemployment
and Employment, 12 J. Econ. Psych. 667 (1991); Ralph Catalano, The Health
Effects of Economic Insecurity, 81 Am. J. Pub. Health 1148 (1991); Robert L. Jin,
Chandrakant P. Shah & Tomislav J. Svoboda, The Impact of Unemployment on
Health: A Review of the Evidence, 153 Canadian Med. Ass'n J. 529 (1995); Anders
Bjorkland, Unemployment and Mental Health: Some Evidence from Panel Data, 20
J. Hum. Resources 469 (1985); Rudy Fenwick & Mark Tausig, The Macroeconomic
Context of Job Stress, 35 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 266 (1994); Bijou Yang, The
Economy and Suicide: A Time-Series Study of the USA, 51 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 87
(1992); Martti E. Heikkinen et al., Age-Related Variation in Recent Life Events
Preceding Suicide, 183 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 325 (1995).
10 See Francis W. Horvath, The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers
of 1981-85, 110 Monthly Lab. Rev. 3 (1987); Michael Podgursky & Paul Swaim,
Health Insurance Loss: The Case of the Displaced Worker, 110 Monthly Lab. Rev.
30 (1987); Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Employment Separation and
Health Insurance Coverage, 66 J. Pub. Econ. 349 (1997).
11 See Jennifer Gardner, Recession Swells Count of Displaced Workers, 116
Monthly Lab. Rev. 14 (1993).
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Control measures that concentrate most of the costs on a small
group can create a large change in disposable income. For example, an
oyster harvesting ban does not slightly reduce incomes of many people,
but it significantly reduces the incomes of a few. The substantial
reduction in income that follows job loss obviously affects many
pathways of health production through reduced private consumption
housing, nutrition, safety, and medical care.
The number of induced deaths is likely to depend not just on the
size of income loss, but also on who bears it. In particular, losses by the
poor are more apt to lead to induced mortality than the same losses by
the wealthy. As an illustration, suppose that individuals try to reduce
risks they face as much as their income allows. The first hazards
mitigated are those posing large risks that are inexpensive to address.
Last on the list of hazards to be addressed would be those posing
relatively small risks that are expensive. Thus, additional income given
to a poor person might be used to mitigate a large risk while a wealthy
person would have already eliminated that risk. Likewise, a cost
imposed on the wealthy might imply a small increase in risk. The same
cost imposed on the poor might imply a more substantial risk increase.
Another reason to suspect that health effects will depend on who
incurs regulatory costs is that profound differences in risk attitudes
exist. Risk perception studies have shown that women are typically
much more likely than men to believe environmental and food
contaminants are safety hazards. 12 That risk attitudes vary implies
differences in willingness to prevent exposure to hazards. That is, the
risk-minimizing adjustments individuals make to income losses ought
not to be expected to be uniform.
Our example is not an unusual public health problem. At the outset,
we know whose risks might be prevented and whose might be induced.
Oyster-related deaths are concentrated among adults suffering from
cirrhosis or immuno-compromising diseases, while the income losses
resulting from a harvesting ban are concentrated in oystering
communities. The following calculations demonstrate the possibility of
transcending qualitative statements and quantitatively estimating the
trade-off between the fatalities induced and prevented.
12 See James Flynn, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race, and Perception of
Environmental Health Risks, 14 RiskAnal. 1101 (1994).
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Data
HHA requires three types of information: (1) the estimate of
targeted premature deaths averted by the control measure; (2) the
functional relation between mortality and income; and (3) the amount
of income losses associated with the public health policy. We use the
latter two to estimate the induced deaths. We discuss the three types of
information below.
Estimated Premature Deaths Averted by the Control Measure
In this application of HHA, the control measure under
consideration is a harvesting prohibition to avoid (on average) 17
premature deaths annually attributed to illnesses raw oyster
consumption causes. 13 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) based this estimate on regional surveillance data
from the Gulf Coast States from 1988 through 1996. The estimate also
accounts for illness underreporting. The number of deaths increased
over time, but whether this results from more complete reporting or an
increase in incidence is unknown. Known deaths were unusually large in
1996, totaling 23. The causes of reported Vibrio vulnificus illnesses
from 1988 through 1995, not including 1996 data, were as follows:
47% were associated with eating contaminated seafood (96% were raw
oysters); 42% were associated with wound infections; and 11% were
unknown. 14 The CDC knew the outcomes of 242 of the 302 reported
infections. Of these, 36% resulted in death. We assume that 17
premature deaths annually could be averted by an oyster harvesting ban
between April 1 and October 31.
Estimated Income-Mortality Tradeoff
Numerous studies offer insights into the relationship between
income and mortality using both macroeconomic data and individual
health and income records. 15 In Viscusi's review, the Chapman and
Hariharan study16 yields an estimate closest to the middle of the
13 Sean Altekruse, CDC epidemiologist, Personal Communication (Aug. 20, 1997).
14 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vibrio Vulnificus Infections
Associated with Eating Raw Oysters - Los Angeles, 1996, 45 Morbidity & Mortality
Wldy. Rep. 621 (1996).
15 See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2 and W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8
J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1994).
16 See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Controlling For Causality in
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range of all studies: one statistical death per $13.3 million income loss
(1992 dollars). Their study is based on individual health and income
records. Because they account for preexisting health problems, the
study is substantially causal, disentangling the impacts of income on
health from health impacts on ability to earn income. 17 The individual
records clearly indicate whose behavior is described. The only
limitation to their analysis is that their data, while extensive, is
necessarily incomplete individual health records. Obviously, no data set
will account for all preexisting health problems or for deaths that
occurred before sampling began. If Chapman and Hariharan's estimate
has any bias, the dollar loss necessary to induce a statistical death may
be too high. Thus, HHA estimates of premature deaths based on their
study may be too low.
Lutter and Morrall reach similar quantitative conclusions about the
relation between income and mortality using cross-section time-series
data of income levels and mortality rates for 101 countries. 18 Their
study suggests one statistical death per $9.3 million income loss (1992
dollars). Because the Lutter and Morrall study uses macroeconomic
data, their estimate is based on a complete accounting of income and
mortality. The use of panel data minimizes the possibility of
unspecified variables confounding the measured influences.
The most significant problem raised by basing HHA on either the
Lutter-Morrall or the Chapman-Hariharan results is that their statistics
reflect aggregate averages. 19 Averages may conceal distributional
effects or may simply misstate induced fatalities when regulations
affect individuals who are not average. Keeney analyzes data from the
National Longitudinal Mortality Study to estimate the relationship
between income and the annual probability of death. He estimates
income-mortality relations for white males, black males, white females,
and black females. For each subpopulation, he estimates the relationship
as a negative exponential function based on the assumption that
the Link from Income to Mortality, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 85 (1994).
17 See John Mullahy & Jody L. Sindelar, Health, Income, and Risk Aversion:
Assessing Some Welfare Costs of Alcoholism and Poor Health, 30 J. Human
Resources 439 (1995).
18 See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2.
19 See id. and Chapman & Hariharan, supra note 7.
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mortality rates fall as income rises, but does so at a diminishing rate. At
very high income levels, additions to income no longer reduce the
probability of death. The imposed functional form recognizes that the
current distribution of income and the distribution of regulatory costs
influence mortality probabilities. Keeney accounts for the influence of
varying risk preferences and individuals' varying ability to withstand
health insults with estimates distinguished by ethnicity and gender.2 0
We use Keeney's estimates to specify the likely induced number of
fatatities. 2 1 Anderson et al. report income, ethnicity, and gender
characteristics of workers within the oyster industry.22 In the oyster
industry, occupations follow ethnic and gender categories; harvesters
are mostly white males and processors are mostly black females. Thus,
calculated losses incurred by occupation can be interpreted in
demographic terms. That is, we calculate baseline income levels and
likely income losses incurred by oyster harvesters and processors. Using
the functions Keeney estimates, the income calculations reveal increases
in fatalities. 23
Estimated Income Losses
Anderson et al. developed an economic impact model to estimate
income losses in Gulf regions resulting from control options to reduce
morbidity and mortality from consuming Vibrio vulnificus-
contaminated oysters. 2 4 The model estimates oyster prices and
harvesting levels under alternative control scenarios. With estimates of
pre- and post-control oyster prices and harvest levels, we calculated the
induced direct income losses borne by oyster fishermen.
Oystering communities generally are located in areas with few
employment alternatives. Many communities are in remote areas, such
as southern Louisiana. Others are in areas with strict zoning protections
for wildlife and water sources that restrict commercial development,
such as the Florida panhandle. These communities already face
economic difficulties that limit re-employment opportunities. Labor
market studies show that workers may suffer permanent income losses
20 See Keeney, supra note 4.
21 See id.
22 See Anderson et al., supra note 5.
23 See Keeney, supra note 4.
24 See Anderson et al., supra note 5.
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following job loss, and some workers may remain jobless for many
years. 25 But, eventually, displaced workers find other employment,
even after a period of unemployment and changing occupations. We
calculate losses assuming workers would leave oystering if their earnings
fell below minimum wage earnings. Thus, losses are the difference
between earnings from oystering and minimum wage. In effect, we
assume workers are immediately reemployed at minimum wage.
When an outside influence diminishes a region's income, there are
additional ripple effects in the region as other economic activities slow
in response. In this case, the influence is a constraint on an economic
activity, oyster harvesting. Related industries, such as oyster processing
and refrigerated transportation, are especially affected. When a control
measure is expected to affect a particular locale, regional input-output
multiplier models are typically employed to determine the indirect
impacts on that region.26 Using county-level oyster harvest data from
each Gulf state, Anderson et al. identified where oyster harvesting is
concentrated. 2 7 They selected four combinations of Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) areas that include these major oyster-
producing counties to construct four Gulf oyster regions. For each of
the four regions, they incorporated the Regional Input-Output
Modeling System (RIMS II) multipliers from the U.S. Department of
Commerce in the model. Then, the economic impact and input-output
multiplier models were used together to estimate the total income
losses.
25 See, e.g., John T. Addison, Douglas A. Fox & Christopher J. Ruhm, Trade and
Displacement in Manufacturing, Monthly Lab. Rev. 58 (April 1995); Louis S.
Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel Sullivan, Earnings Losses of Displaced
Workers, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 685 (1993); Lori Kletzer, Industry Wage Differentials
and Wait Unemployment, 31 Indus. Rel. 250 (1992); Christopher J. Ruhm, Are
Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Displacements?, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 319
(1991); Christopher J. Ruhm, Displacement Induced Joblessness, 73 Rev. Econ. &
Stat. 517 (1991); Daniel S. Hamermesh, What Do We Know About Worker
Displacement in the U.S.? 28 Indus. Rel. 51 (1989).
26 See, e.g., Cletus C. Coughlin & Thomas B. Mandelbaum, A Consumers'
Guide to Regional Economic Multipliers, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Rev. 19
(Jan.-Feb. 1991); Joel R. Hamilton et al., Economic Impacts, Value Added, and
Benefits in Regional Project Analysis, 73 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 334 (1991); Joel R.
Hamilton et al., Interregional Spillovers in Regional Impact Assessment: New
Mexico, Texas, and the Supreme Court, 25 Growth & Change 75 (1994).
27 See Anderson et al., supra note 5.
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Estimated Health Transfers
With a harvesting ban, Gulf oyster-related Vibrio vulnificus
mortality may be reduced. These benefits would be distributed to the
extent harvesters distribute and the public consumes Gulf oysters across
the U.S., but would be concentrated within an identified "at-risk"
population with existing medical risks, including liver disease and
immuno-compromising illnesses. The costs of an oyster-harvesting ban
would be concentrated in the Gulf oystering communities. The income
losses and induced premature mortality would vary for each
occupational group.
Table 1 shows the income losses estimated by Anderson et al. and
the expected induced mortality trade-offs by occupation. 2 8 After
adjusting the compliance costs and wage estimates to 1991 dollars,
consistent with Keeney, we evaluate the expected mortality trade-offs
in the Gulf states by occupation. 2 9 The total estimated induced
mortalities from all income losses lies in a range between eight and
twelve deaths. This can be compared to the estimated 17 oyster-related
deaths that the harvesting ban would target to reduce.
Table 1
Estimated Income Losses and Induced Mortality ($1,991)
Harvesters Processors All Other Gulfwide
Total Income Losses $16.9 M $13.0 M $25.2 M $55.1 M
Income Loss Per Worker $15,339 $9,857 $1.00 na
Mortality Rate Increase
Per Person 2.82 x 10-3  2.13 x 10-3  2.4 x 10"7-7.3 x 10-8  na
Estimated Income-
Mortality Trade-off $5.4 M $4.6 M $4.2 - 13.7 M na
Total Induced Mortality
Estimate 3.1 2.8 1.9 - 6.0 8 -12
The first row of Table 1 shows harvesters would lose approximately
$17 million annually and processors would lose $13 million. Based on
the Gulf states' interviews conducted by Anderson et al., absent the
ban, harvester's average annual income is $29,655 (in 1995 dollars), and
processing workers average $20,000.30 A seven-month harvesting ban
28 See id.
29 See Keeney, supra note 4.
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would reduce harvester income by about $17,200, and processor
income by about $11,600. Based on Keeney's model and parameter
estimates for these two gender/ethnicity subpopulations, the annual
mortality probability would increase by 0.00282 for harvesters, and by
0.00213 for processors as shown in Row 3 of Table 1.3 1 Row 4 shows
that an induced income loss of $5.4 million for harvesters would result
in one statistical fatality, and a loss of $4.6 million for processors would
result in one statistical fatality.
Column 3 of Table 1 indicates the income loss borne by workers of
other indirectly affected occupations. Income losses affect suppliers to
the oyster industry and lost purchasing power of consumers. Local
economies experience reductions in economic activity. For this
illustration, we assume that the average 1995 income for all occupations
is $20,970 ($18,747 adjusted to 1991 dollars) for the southeastern
U.S. 3 2 We assume the losses are spread uniformly across the
approximately 20 million employed persons in the five Gulf states, with
members of each of the four subpopulations incurring the same dollar
cost. 3 3 Thus, we derive four estimates of risk increases. As shown in
Row 5 of Table 1, evaluating the incremental mortality risk for all four
gender/ethnicity subpopulations results in a range of 1.9 - 6.0 induced
statistical fatalities for all other occupations.
If we use the mean income-average mortality estimate from Lutter
and Morrall and Chapman and Hariharan, instead of Keeney's
estimates, 4.5 premature fatalities are estimated in the Gulf states. 34
However, many analysts argue that we should expect a greater-than-
average mortality response within a low-income group. 3 5 The 4.5
fatality result must be biased downward as negative impacts accrue to
identifiable oystering communities. We follow Keeney's analysis that
accounts for income, gender, and ethnicity differences. Using Keeney's
30 See Anderson et al., supra note 5.
31 See Keeney, supra note 4.
32 See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Comprehensive Revision of State
Personal Income 1969-95, 76 Surv. Current Bus. 48 (1996).
33 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996 (116th
ed.).
34 See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2; Chapman & Hariharan, supra note 7 and
Keene , supra note 4. We use the mid-point of $12.2 million of the range from $10
to $1 million [1995 dollars].
35 See Lutter & Morral, supra note 2 and Chapman & Hariharan, supra note 7.
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functions may understate the number of induced deaths as the
functions do not account for impacts on dependents of harvesters and
processors.
Policy Guidance HHA Offers
This application shows the deminishing health of those incurring
regulatory compliance costs, by enacting a harvesting ban. Our results
suggest that while a seven-month oyster harvesting ban may avert
approximately 17 Gulf oyster-related premature deaths, the income
losses that would accompany the ban would induce as many as 12
deaths. In effect, health is transferred from individuals in oyster
communities to medically at-risk oyster consumers.
Under conventional cost-benefit analysis, analysts calculate net
benefits (dollar benefits <minus>dollar costs) and thereby rank diverse
types of health and safety programs. Positive net benefits (benefits
<minus> costs) indicate that a program is a desirable use of public
resources, using the benefit-cost paradigm. Alternatively, one could
calculate net benefits using HHA (net lives saved <equals> lives saved
<minus> lives lost) and use that number to rank programs and decide
which are desirable. For example, a policy that prevents 17 deaths and
induces 8 to 12 deaths is inferior to one that preventes 15 deaths but
induces only two deaths. Either policy is superior to one that preventes
20 deaths but induces 18.
There are conditions sufficient for this latter notion of net benefits
to yield policy guidance that is qualitatively similar to guidance from
conventional cost-benefit analyses. Examination of those conditions is
worthwhile because they show HHA shares some characteristics with
conventional cost-benefit analysis, but offers a unique perspective on the
value of public health and safety programs.
Four conditions are sufficient to use HHA to rank programs and to
show which programs are worthwhile (offering positive net benefits):
" There is a market failure.
" All deaths count the same.
* Discounting makes present and future benefits and costs
comparable.
* Decision makers' only concern is lives - lives lost and
lives saved.
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Market failure - With both conventional cost-benefit analysis and
HHA, positive net benefits of a program exist only if markets have
failed. There must be some institutional or informational problem
preventing consumers from mitigating a hazard they consider worth
addressing (or, would consider worth addressing if they were fully
aware of the hazard). Without a compelling argument that markets fail
to satisfy consumers' demands for risk reduction, there is no argument
for a corrective public action. Whether analysts calculate net benefits
using conventional cost-benefit analysis or HHA is irrelevant if there is
no demand for a government remedy. In our example, we implicitly
assume that consumers are unaware of the risk from Vibrio vulnificus.
Of course, at least some oyster consumers are aware of the risks as
restaurant menus in the Gulf states carry notices about risks. If
consumers are aware of the risk and voluntarily accept it, say, because
they enjoy raw oysters more than they fear Vibrio vulnificus, or
because they enjoy risk taking, then there is no market failure.
All deaths count the same - While few are troubled when cost-
benefit analyses count dollar benefits just like dollar costs, it is less clear
that regulatory decision makers are willing to count lives saved just like
lives lost. Graham and Segui-Gomez provide a stark perspective on the
importance of policy-induced deaths. In discussing the actuarial
evidence of the benefits of passenger-side airbags, they state that a 5:1
ratio of deaths averted to deaths induced is unacceptable: 3 6
Overall, the best estimates are that for every five lives saved
by front-right passenger airbags, a life (usually a child) is
lost. We are aware of no precedent in the history of
preventive medicine where a mandatory measure was
sustained with such a poor ratio of lifesaving benefit to fatal
risk.
In contrast, a benefit-cost ratio of five, measured in dollars, would say
that every dollar spent by the public sector would return $5 in benefits.
It would be difficult to argue against carrying out program with a
benefit-cost ratio that high.
Net benefits calculations draw attention to distributional issues
when lives are the unit of account. Like airbags, Vibrio vulnificus also
36 See John D. Graham & Maria Segui-Gomez, Airbags: Benefits and Risks, 5 Risk
in Perspective 1 (1997), at 2.
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highlights distributional issues. Lives saved by a harvesting ban would
be, for the most part, the immune-compromised. Lives lost would
include some oyster workers. When dollars are the unit of account,
economists usually assume dollars offer the same utility to all. Under
this assumption, a finding that dollar-denominated net benefits are
positive implies a project is worthwhile from a utility maximizing
perspective. If, instead of lives, years of life were the unit of account,
HHA could offer similarly straightforward policy guidance, on the
assumption that all years of life are equally valuable.
Discounting makes present and future benefits and costs
comparable - When calculating dollar-denominated costs and
benefits, analysts discount future dollars to present value terms, as if all
benefits and costs were incurred immediately. This is necessary because
program costs are often incurred before health benefits are realized. The
calculation reflects consumers' opportunities as they can readily borrow
or loan money, transforming expenses and earnings into current dollars.
This calculation gives less weight in decision making to future benefits
and costs than to current benefits and costs.
Denominating costs and benefits in lives rather than dollars does
not eliminate the problem that costs and benefits accrue at different
times. From an HI-HA perspective, lives lost ought to be expected to fall
over time because negative impacts on income will fall; eventually, most
individuals who lose jobs will find new jobs. Thus, interventions for
which lives lost initially exceed lives saved may reverse over time. Net
benefits could not be determined to be either positive or negative
without addressing the discount question in these cases. Analysts could
apply discounting factors to future lives. However, the calculation
requires deciding whether lives saved today are equivalent to lives saved
in the future.
Decision makers' only concern is lives - lives lost and lives saved
- Lives can be counted in a straightforward way. So far, HHA
applications have focused on mortality without explicitly including
morbidity. Although some target risk morbidity information may be
available, no comparable morbidity and income studies are available.
Without this latter linkage, the net public health profile is incomplete.
However, even with a complete public health profile, HHA would still
be a weaker test than dollar-denominated cost-benefit analysis. The
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bottom-line costs that are relevant for HHA are the induced adverse
health consequences. These are realized because individuals contract
spending on risk reducing activities when they face higher taxes and
new regulatory compliance costs. But, as individuals spend only a
portion of their income on risk reduction, HHA neglects the negative
impacts of dollar losses on all other activities. In effect, programs that
HHA indicates are worthwhile could be quite different from programs
that pass a dollar-denominated cost-benefit test.
Nevertheless, net lives saved could be used as a measure of net
benefits. Calculating net lives saved, analysts could rank diverse health
and safety programs, determining which are worthwhile. However, the
four conditions that must be satisfied for net lives saved to function in
this manner are controversial, and unlikely to be universally accepted.
HHA may be of practical significance even when the conditions are not
met. Usually, choices involve only the fate of a specific program. HHA
provides unique information to these decisions. When programs single
out specific subpopulations for special protection, HHA provides a view
of the opportunity costs of programs that conventional cost-benefit
analysis cannot. HHA reminds program advocates that there are real
lives at stake, and not just dollars.
Like any risk assessment or cost-benefit analysis, HHA calculations
will usually entail significant uncertainty. The primary uncertainty in
our example is the predicted loss of lives from decreased income, which
is difficult to measure even after decisions are made. Predicted deaths
are too small in number to show up in mortality rate statistics. The
exact cause of induced deaths is necessarily undetermined. The
decreased death rate from reducing the supply of oysters from the Gulf
is less uncertain than the induced death calculation, although the
average deaths we have reported contains a considerable amount of
variability. A more precise measure of income loss to harvesters, or to
related industries could make a major change in our net lives saved
calculation, possibly making the positive number negative. Similarly, a
more precise estimate of the relation between income and mortality
rates could have a major impact on net lives saved. However, these
uncertainties are no larger than is typical of most risk assessments or
conventional cost-benefit analyses.
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Conclusion
Historically, regulatory agencies have interpreted many human
health and safety laws to require that hazards be considered
individually, without consideration of countervailing risks. 37 Legal
interpretation guides risk assessment for these hazards, and quantifies
only the risk of individual activities or compounds. Decisions following
these risk assessments are almost universally concerned with minimizing
only the target risk. Recent regulatory reform efforts attempt to
promote more cost-effective policies and a greater variety of policy
analyses, including the effect of regulatory expenditures on income and
mortality.38
The traditional public health approach that focuses on target risks
and runs through most law/risk assessment decision criteria serves to
improve public health, particularly for risks with minimal uncertainty.
The federal government's successful reduction of large quantities of
lead in the environment illustrates this approach. However, many small
risks now face diminishing marginal returns to expenditures to reduce
them.3 9 When the public sector attempts to control risks for which the
cost per target life saved is very high, the reduction in the target risk
may not be greater than the increase in the unintended risk.
HHA shares some characteristics with Risk-Risk Analysis. Both
presume a social goal of minimizing adverse health outcomes. Both
recognize that intervention may have undesirable and unintended
consequences. The difference lies in the source each analytical method
examines for undesirable and unintended consequences. Risk-Risk
Analysis examines how fulfilling government mandates for risk
reduction is itself risky. HHA instead examines how diminishing
individuals' incomes and opportunities to care for themselves influence
the risks they bear. As a practical matter, our example reveals that
37 See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in
Risk vs. Risk. Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (. D. Graham &
J. B. Wiener, eds. 1995).
38 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Economic Foundations of the Current Regulatory
Reform Efforts, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 119 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of
Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria, 25 RAND J. Econ. 94 (1994).
39 See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation, Nov.-Dec. 1986,
at 25; Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Effectiveness, 15 RiskAnal. 369 (1995).
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undesirable and unintended consequences may offset the desirable and
intended consequences. In our example, 17 premature deaths caused by
ingestion of Vibrio vulnificus must be compared with eight to twelve
deaths caused by income loss.
Potentially, HHA may point to risk trade-offs that Risk-Risk
Analysis cannot identify. When a government regulation calls a halt to
the use of a substance, activity, or production method and no feasible
replacement exists, Risk-Risk Analysis will not identify adverse health
outcomes, even if income levels fall. HHA can help to ensure that risk
managers internalize the public health costs of their decisions,
particularly in cases with large per-capita costs.
